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Abstract  
In September 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor issued a new 
policy paper detailing the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) priorities for case selection 
and prioritization, including giving a ‘particular consideration to prosecuting Rome 
Statute crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction 
of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal 
dispossession of land’. This new commitment of the OTP in fighting environmental 
devastation has been received enthusiastically by civil society and alleged victims. Indeed, 
few would disagree that protecting the environment against harmful conduct and 
conserving the world’s natural resources are some of the most compelling challenges 
faced by the international community. Further, the negative impact of environmental 
destruction on human rights, and peace and security, is a matter of concern for many 
international institutions, including the United Nations Security Council. This article 
considers the merits and limits of prosecuting environmental destruction before the ICC. 
It contends that the significance and practical implications of the OTP’s green shift ought 
to be appreciated against the constraints posed by existing criminal provisions (which 
have already received attention in the literature) and, more significantly, factual and 
structural challenges that have been more peripheral in the academic debate. 
Accordingly, the article suggests possible ways to overcome some of these obstacles. The 
article concludes by reflecting on the necessity to strike a balance between the OTP’s 
commendable policy shift, victims’ and environmental activists’ expectations, and the 
ICC’s possible contribution to ‘environmental justice’.  
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‘Sognai talmente forte che mi uscì il sangue dal naso’ 
F. De Andrè, Fiume Sand Creek 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the Tri Hita Karana philosophy, which originates from Bali, three 
harmonious relationships must be cultivated for the well-being and prosperity of 
the whole humanity: human to human, human to Gods and human to the 
environment. Decades of unsustainable economic growth, aggressive extraction of 
natural resources, and egoistic consumption patterns (particularly in the Global 
North) have deteriorated the bond between humans and the environment. 
Although few may deny the urgency of the matter, environmental degradation and 
critical resource scarcity are some of the most compelling challenges that the 
international community is facing — which, if not taken seriously, may well 
endanger peace and security, and the very survival of humankind.  
Environmental protection is a cross-sectoral problem, with implications 
inter alia for human rights, security, and trade regimes. Hence, from a legal 
perspective, different sub-fields of international law and enforcement mechanisms 
are relevant to confronting environmental concerns. The ‘global’ nature of the 
protected interests and the erga omnes character of many international 
environmental obligations are the main arguments in favour of the international 
criminalization of certain environmental harms.1 Indeed, some treaties impose an 
obligation on states to criminalize within their domestic systems acts that may 
result in severe damage to the environment.2 In accordance with the subject of this 
symposium, the focus of this article is on international criminal law stricto sensu 
                                                          
1  For a comprehensive account of the arguments in favour and against the international 
criminalization of environmental concerns, see e.g. F. Mégret, ‘The Problem of an International 
Criminal Law of the Environment’, 36 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law (2011) 195.  
2  E.g. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES); Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal. 
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and, in particular, on ‘core crimes’ set forth in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). 
The Preamble to the Statute solemnly affirms that an independent 
permanent International Criminal Court ‘with jurisdiction over the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’ is created ‘for the 
sake of the present and future generations’. Yet a very limited reference to the 
protection of the environment is made within the Statute’s provisions. This is not 
particularly surprising considering the predominantly anthropocentric character of 
international criminal law (and the laws of war and human rights law with which 
it is interwoven), the relatively recent emergence of environmental concerns in the 
international arena, and states’ preference for other forms of regulation in this 
respect (e.g. international environmental law and ‘soft approaches’). 
Conversely, the academic debate on a possible role for international 
criminal law (and more specifically the ICC) in advancing the protection of the 
environment in peace and wartimes has been quite prolific, especially in the last 
decade or so. Hence, to those familiar with these academic endeavours and non-
governmental organization (NGO) advocacy efforts, the 2016 Policy Paper issued 
by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) did not come as a total surprise. This 
document detailed the Prosecutor’s priorities for case selection, including a 
‘particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are committed 
by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land’.3 More 
precisely, in assessing the gravity of crime(s) — one of the criteria for case 
selection — the OTP reaffirmed that it will consider the scale, nature, manner of 
commission and impact of the crimes.4 Environmental concerns inform both the 
                                                          
3 OTP, Policy Paper on Case selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, available online at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf (visited 
25 May 2017) (‘2016 Policy Paper’), § 41. One may wonder whether the use of the term 
‘destruction’ of the environment, in lieu (for instance) of degradation, has a particular meaning or 
not. What the term suggests, anyway, is that the OTP will give particular consideration to the most 
severe forms of environmental harms, those that result not just in the temporary loss of 
environmental values, but in long-term and potentially permanent damage. 
4 Ibid., § 37. 
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manner of commission of the crimes (i.e. ‘the use of … crimes committed by 
means of, or resulting in, the destruction of the environment’5) and the impact of 
the crimes, which will be evaluated in light of ‘the environmental damage 
inflicted on the affected community’.6 The ICC’s possible future engagement with 
the three environmental wrongs mentioned (i.e. destruction of the environment, 
illegal natural resource exploitation, and land dispossession) raises hope, but also 
several questions.  
This article considers the merits and limits of prosecuting environmental 
destruction before the ICC. It contends that the significance and practical 
implications of the OTP’s green shift ought to be appreciated against the 
constraints posed by existing provisions (which have already received attention in 
the literature) and, more significantly, factual and structural challenges that have 
been more peripheral in the academic debate. Accordingly, this article suggests 
possible ways to overcome some of these obstacles. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Part II recapitulates the 
debate on the capacity of international criminal law provisions to proscribe 
environmental harms committed in wartime and peacetime. The analysis will be 
informed by the reference in the 2016 Policy Paper to two ways in which 
environmental concerns may be addressed in the future practice of the Office: first, 
through the prosecution of Rome Statute crimes ‘that are committed by means 
of … the destruction of the environment’; second, through the prosecution of 
crimes ‘that result in the destruction of the environment.’ Part III ponders the 
practical implications of the 2016 Policy Paper for environmental protection. First, 
it traces additional reasons (beyond the letter of the law) for the limited 
engagement of international criminal justice with ‘environmental crimes’, notably 
the problems with causation and evidence gathering. Second, it questions whether 
and to what extent the functions and remedies of international criminal justice can 
be reconciled with those of environmental preservation. Part IV concludes.  
                                                          
5 Ibid., § 40. 





2. The Rome Statute and Environmental Concerns: Origins and 
Evolution of the Debate on Environmental Protection through 
International Criminal Law 
A. The Environment as a ‘Victim’ of International Crimes 
The 2016 Policy Paper suggests two ways in which environmental matters may be 
addressed in future by the OTP, which reflect the traditional divide between 
anthropocentric and ecocentric perspectives on environmental protection: first, 
through the prosecution of Rome Statute crimes ‘that are committed by means 
of … the destruction of the environment’; second, through the prosecution of 
crimes ‘that result in the destruction of the environment’. In the former, the 
natural environment is the means by which humanitarian norms, upholding human 
values, are breached; in the latter, nature itself can be considered as the direct or 
indirect beneficiary of the protection. This section maps out the historical origins 
of the efforts to criminalize acts that result in the destruction of the environment, 
before considering the most recent academic debate on the sole ecocentric 
provision in the ICC Statute. 
The term often used to describe the intentional and most dramatic form of 
environmental devastation, susceptible of international criminal punishment, is 
‘ecocide’. The birth of the concept dates back to the Vietnam War, when it was 
employed to depict the severe environmental and human impact of certain US 
military tactics, most notably the massive use of herbicides (e.g. Agent Orange) to 
destroy forests and crops. The term was coined by a plant biologist, Arthur 
Galston, to characterize the ‘willful, permanent destruction of environments in 
which people can live in a manner of their choosing’.7 At a conference on War 
                                                          
7 D. Zierler, Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientists Who Changed the 
Way We Think About the Environment (University of Georgia Press, 2011), at 15. 
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Crimes and the America Conscience held in 1970, Galston condemned Operation 
Ranch Hand and asked the international community, through the United Nations, 
to come together against ecocide, just as the world did after World War II against 
genocide and crimes against humanity.8  
Richard Falk developed this set of ideas and framed them in legal terms. In 
his 1973 publication, Environmental Warfare and Ecocide: Facts, Appraisal and 
Proposals, having identified the limits of international humanitarian law in the 
area of environmental protection, Falk called for the development of new legal 
instruments, namely an International Convention on the Crime of Ecocide and a 
Draft Protocol on Environmental Warfare.9 Falk argued that such a normative 
agenda had gained momentum, as the ‘public outrage over the desecration of the 
land’ in Vietnam ‘creates a target of opportunity comparable to Nuremberg’.10 
And ‘just as the Genocide Convention came along to formalize part of what has 
already been carried and punished at Nuremberg, so an Ecocide Convention could 
help carry forward into the future a legal condemnation of environmental warfare 
in Indochina’.11 Falk’s proposed Convention on the Crime of Ecocide defined 
ecocide as encompassing ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a human ecosystem’, in peacetime or wartime.12  
Both Galston’s and Falk’s proposals for the expansion of international law 
to proscribe attacks against the environment under the crime of ecocide were 
influenced by the dramatic experience of the Vietnam War. Beyond the short 
parenthesis of Article 26 of the 1991 ILC Draft Code on Crimes Against Peace 
and Security of Mankind, 13  the narrower focus on punishing environmental 
                                                          
8  B. Leebaw, ‘Scorched Earth: Environmental War Crimes and International Justice’, 12 
Perspectives on Politics (2014) 770, at 777. 
9 R. Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare and Ecocide: Facts, Appraisal and Proposals’, 4 Bulletin of 
Peace Proposals (1973) 80. 
10 Ibid., at 84. 
11 Ibid., at 84. 
12 Ibid., at 93, Appendix I. 
13 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2), Art. 26: ‘Wilful and severe damage to the environment’ 
(‘[a]n individual who wilfully causes or orders the causing of widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced to …’). Art. 26 was 
later deleted from the final version of the Draft Code. 
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devastation in times of war has been carried on until the present day. Several 
factors may explain this approach, notably the strong bonds that tie international 
criminal law and international humanitarian law together, and the parallel 
emergence of international environmental law, considered by most states as the 
preferred avenue to address peacetime environmental concerns.  
The Rome Statute, thus, built upon earlier provisions in the laws of armed 
conflict, 14  and introduced the first ecocentric war crime. 15  Article 8(2)(b)(iv) 
prohibits, in the context of international armed conflict, ‘intentionally launching 
an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause … widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment, which would be clearly excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’. 
Undoubtedly, introducing a war crime punishing harm to the environment has a 
strong symbolic value: it recognizes that environmental integrity is a fundamental 
interest that deserves protection during armed conflict, and that violating this 
interest entails the most severe sanction, criminal responsibility.  
Yet scholars drew attention to several limitations of Article 8(2)(b)(iv), 
notably: a high threshold of damage, the vagueness of the terms employed, the 
reliance upon the proportionality test, the mental element requiring strict 
intentionality, and its application only in the context of international armed 
conflict.16 Whilst it is impracticable to explore such arguments in detail here, it is 
                                                          
14 See Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (‘ENMOD Convention’) (10 December 1976); see also Additional 
Protocol I, Arts 35(3) (prohibiting ‘methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment’), 55 
(‘[c]are shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term 
and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of 
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment 
and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population. Attacks against the natural 
environment by way of reprisals are prohibited’).  
15 Violations of Arts 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I are not listed as grave breaches, 
whereas the ENMOD Convention does not impose criminal liability in case of violation of its 
provisions. 
16 E.g. J.C. Lawrence and K.J. Heller, ‘The First Ecocentric Environmental War Crime: The Limits 
of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute’, 20 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review (GIELR) (Fall 2007) 61. 
 8 
 
useful to outline the core concerns raised by commentators, to better appreciate 
the significance of the OTP’s green shift. 
First, the actus reus of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) requires the launching of an attack 
(but the environment does not have to be the target of the attack), with the 
knowledge that it will cause ‘widespread, long term and severe damage to the 
natural environment’. Although the concept of ‘attack’ is not limited to a single 
act of warfare, it is circumscribed to a certain time and space, hence it is narrower 
and less flexible than the expression ‘methods and means of warfare’ in 
Additional Protocol I. 17  The three qualifiers are conjunctive and there is no 
definition of those terms in the Rome Statute or its Elements of Crimes. The 
ENMOD Convention employs similar language, and provides a definition of the 
three concepts, but these definitions are apparently limited to their specific 
context.18 The travaux préparatoires to Additional Protocol I qualify ‘long-term’ 
as damage ‘that lasts decades’, but are silent on the exact meaning of ‘widespread’ 
and ‘severe’.19 
Second, the damage to the natural environment has to be ‘clearly excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’. The 
provision reproduces the proportionality principle familiar from the traditional jus 
                                                          
17 I. Paterson, ‘The Natural Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: A Concern for International 
War Crimes Law?’ 22 Leiden Journal of International Law (2009) 325, at 337. 
18 In the Understanding regarding the ENMOD Convention, annexed to the treaty, the adjectives 
‘widespread’, ‘long-lasting’ and ‘severe’ are defined as follows: ‘widespread: encompassing an 
area of the scale of several hundred square kilometres’; ‘long-lasting: lasting for a period of 
months, or approximately, a season’; ‘severe: involving serious or significant disruption or harm to 
human life, natural and economic resources or other assets’. The treaty clearly states that this 
interpretation is limited to the ENMOD Convention and does not apply to the ‘same or similar 
terms used in different agreements’. It is noteworthy that the definition of ‘severe’ brings 
anthropocentric concerns back into the provisions. On the point see e.g. M. Drumbl, ‘International 
Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and Environmental Security, Can the International 
Criminal Court Bridge the Gaps?’ 6 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law (1999-
2000) 305, at 316 
19 Lawrence and Heller, supra note 16, at 73. Some commentators have suggested that the term 
may be interpreted as follows: ‘widespread’ as encompassing at least an entire region of several 
hundreds of kilometres; ‘severe’ as causing death, ill-health or loss of sustenance to thousands of 
people, at present or in the future. See A. Leibler, ‘Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: 
New Challenges for International Law’, as cited by Steven Freeland, Addressing the International 
Destruction of the Environment during Warfare Under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Intersentia, 2015), at 87. 
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in bello. By doing so, however, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) represents a step backward 
compared with the protection against environmental damage in Additional 
Protocol I.20 Not only does it add uncertainty by referring to proportionality at 
all,21 but it also requires the damage to the natural environment to be ‘clearly 
excessive’ (not just excessive) in relation to the military advantage anticipated.22  
Third, in terms of mens rea, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) requires knowledge and 
intent that the conduct (launching an attack) will cause widespread, long-lasting 
and severe damage to the environment, and that such damage would be 
disproportionate (‘clearly excessive’) in relation to the military advantage 
anticipated.23 Negligent, wilfully blind or reckless conduct is outside the scope of 
the norm.24 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the protection of the natural 
environment is not only limited to armed conflict but only to international armed 
conflict.  
On the basis of these limitations in the text of Article 8(2)(b)(iv), a range of 
proposals have been put forward by scholars to enhance the protection of the 
environment from harmful conduct. More conservative approaches contend that 
existing war crimes applicable in non-international and international armed 
conflict may be used to impose liability for acts resulting, inter alia, in 
                                                          
20 Under the special regime of Art. 55, Additional Protocol I, the three elements of ‘widespread, 
long-term and severe damage’ are introduced in lieu of the proportionality test. Should the three 
criteria be met, the attack will violate the Protocol, even if proportional. See Y. Dinstein, The 
Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), at 186. It should be noted, however, that violating Art. 55 of Additional Protocol I 
does not result in individual criminal responsibility: see Art. 85. 
21 E.g. M. Gillett, ‘Environmental Damage and International Criminal Law’, in S. Jodoin and M.C. 
Cordonier Segger (eds), Sustainable Development, International Criminal Justice and Treaty 
Implementation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 73, at 83. 
22 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), at 60-61, emphasis 
added. 
23 It has been observed that, in the ICC Elements of Crimes, the ‘military advantage anticipated’ 
refers to ‘a military advantage that is foreseeable by the perpetrator at the relevant time’, which 
should therefore be evaluated on a subjective basis. It is not evident whether the ‘clearly 
excessive’ requirement is based on objective or subjective standards. The Elements of Crimes 
require the perpetrator to ‘make the value judgment’, but they also call for ‘an evaluation of that 
value judgment’ to be based on the information available to the perpetrator at the time. See 
Lawrence and Heller, supra note 16, at 83. 
24 Drumbl, supra note 18, at 322. 
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environmental degradation.25 This offers the advantage of relying on established 
provisions in the laws of armed conflict, already tested before international 
criminal fora. However, other commentators contend that such a solution is 
inadequate to address pure ecocentric concerns, and suggest amending Article 
8(2)(b)(iv).26 A third approach goes further and proposes the creation a new genus 
of ‘crimes against the environment’ to punish the destruction of the natural 
environment in armed conflict. 27  A final, more radical perspective seeks to 
criminalize severe environmental damage even outside armed conflict.28 Whether 
those proposals will receive support from the international community of States 
remains to be seen; for the time being, the OTP will have to rely on the narrow 
text of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) or other war crimes provisions to prosecute conduct that 
result in environmental damage. 
B. Environmental Destruction as a Means to Commit International Crimes 
The second way in which environmental concerns may be addressed by the OTP 
in the future is through prosecuting crimes that are committed by means of 
environmental destruction. In such a situation, the interest protected by the norm 
criminalizing a certain behaviour is not the integrity of the environment per se, but 
fundamental human values, and environmental considerations are only 
instrumental in upholding these values. The OTP’s position is coherent with, and 
                                                          
25 E.g. C. Bruch, ‘The Environmental Law of War, All’s not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability 
for Environmental Damage in Internal Armed Conflict’, 25 Vermont Law Review (2001) 695, at 
718-719  (referring to provisions in the Rome Statute criminalizing attacks against civilian objects 
and destruction of enemy property not justified by military necessity).  
26 E.g. Lawrence and Heller, supra note 16, at 88 (proposing, in particular, clarifying the meaning 
of ‘widespread, long-term and severe’, lowering the proportionality test, making the subjective 
element more objective, and extending the provision to non-international armed conflict).  
27 Freeland, supra note 19, at 219-287 (proposing ‘crimes against the environment’ characterized 
by: anticipatory protection of the environment, as the actus reus does not require that ‘actual 
harm’ to the environment is ‘achieved’; application both in international and non-international 
armed conflicts; defining ‘widespread’, ‘long-term’ and ‘severe’ as disjunctive requirements of 
environmental damage; penalizing a non-exclusive list of environmental damage; encompassing 
dolus directus, dolus eventualis and willful blindness within the mens rea).  
28 E.g. S. Jodoin, ‘Conclusion: Protecting the Rights of Future Generations through Existing and 
New International Criminal Law’, in Jodoin and Cordonier Segger (eds), supra note 21, 346, at 
346; F. Mégret, ‘The Case for a General International Crime Against the Environment’, in Jodoin 
and Cordonier Segger (eds), ibid., at 50.  
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perhaps informed by, literature arguing that genocide and crimes against humanity 
may well be employed to prosecute episodes of environmental degradation, when 
they are a means to perpetrate a humanitarian atrocity. 29  According to Tara 
Weinstein, such an approach is not only feasible but builds on the precedent of the 
Akayesu case before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, where rape 
was considered as a means to commit genocide. Similarly, ‘environmental 
destruction can be prosecuted as an accelerator of genocide or crimes against 
humanity’.30 
There is also already some precedent in the ICC's own practice. In Al Bashir, 
the Prosecutor sought the arrest of the defendant for genocide for having 
destroyed ‘all the target groups’ means of survival, poison sources of water 
including communal wells, destroy water pumps, steal livestock and strip the 
towns and villages of household and community assets’. 31 Initially, the majority 
of judges of Pre-Trial Chamber I dismissed the allegation because of the lack of 
‘reasonable grounds to believe that such a contamination was a core feature of 
their attacks’.32 However, in a second decision on the application for a warrant of 
arrest, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that ‘the act of contamination of water pumps 
and forcible transfer, coupled by resettlement by member of other tribes, were 
committed in furtherance of a genocidal policy and that the conditions of life 
inflicted on the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups were calculated to bring about 
the group’s physical destruction of part of those ethnic groups’.33 The Pre-Trial 
                                                          
29 E.g. T. Weinstein, ‘Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes or 
Humanitarian Atrocities’, 17 GIELR (2004-2005) 697. 
30 Ibid., at 714-716 (examining the case of the Marsh Arabs, a Muslim Shi’a group living in 
Southern Iraq, that suffered direct killings and more indirect attacks including the draining of the 
Mesopotamian Marshes, which destroyed the ecosystem where they had been living for thousands 
of years, resulting in widespread deaths and forced resettlements). 
31 Public Redacted Version of the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, Situation in Darfur 
(ICC-02/05-157-AnxA), Office of the Prosecutor, 14 July 2008, § 14.  
32 Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad 
Al Bashir, Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-3), Pre-Trial Chamber, 4 March 2009, § 93.  
33 Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 




Chamber thus found a nexus between the underlying environmental harm (water 
contamination) and the crime of genocide.  
The prospects for testing the genocide charges against Al Bashir before the 
Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers are not encouraging, at least in the near future. 
Nonetheless, the Prosecutor’s approach appears promising and, in principle, there 
is no reason why it cannot be replicated in the future. Undoubtedly, the critical 
element in bringing a charge for genocide concerns proof the special intent (i.e. 
‘to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’), 
which must accompany the commission of the underlying offence. In the case of 
environmental destruction, arguably the most pertinent would be ‘deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part’. Yet in the majority of peacetime cases, 
governments will seek to justify environmental degradation and its adverse 
humanitarian effects pursuant to development concerns, hence raising the bar in 
proving the dolus specialis.34 
In addition to genocide, environmental destruction can be ‘used’ to commit 
crimes against humanity, such as extermination, forcible transfer of population, 
persecution, and other inhuman acts. Persecution, which is defined as ‘the 
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international 
law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’, appears particularly 
relevant.35 There should be no doubt that critical resource scarcity, such as lack of 
access to clean water or food, resulting from serious environmental degradation, 
constitutes a breach of fundamental human rights.  
Should the OTP decide to pursue this avenue,36 the Prosecutor may be able 
to rely on the argumentative tools developed by some scholars.37 At the same time, 
                                                          
34  D. Sharp, ‘Prospects for Environmental Liability in the International Criminal Court’, 18 
Virginia Environmental Law Journal (1999) 217, at 234. 
35 Art. 7(2)(g) ICCSt.  
36  A possible test-case for crimes against humanity in the context of environmental wrongs, 
broadly defined, is the communication submitted in October 2014 to the ICC Prosecutor accusing 
the Cambodian authorities of crimes against humanity through systematic land-grabbing and 
deforestation. For an analysis of how the 2016 Policy Paper might affect the interpretation of the 
constitutive elements of crimes against humanity committed by means of, or resulting in damage 
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as with genocidal intent, the main constraint on applying these provisions to 
sanction environmental damage as the means to commit crimes against humanity 
lies in the contextual elements set forth in Article 7(1), namely the existence of a 
widespread or systematic attack, and the knowledge requirement.38 
 
C. The OTP’s Case Selection Policy and Implications for Environmental 
Protection 
1. Beyond the Limits of Substantive Rules: the Need to Overcome Factual 
and Evidentiary Challenges 
It is safe to say that, until now, the judicial treatment of environmental concerns 
by international criminal tribunals has been limited. With the exception of few 
cases from the post-World War II Tribunals,39 and the Al-Bashir case at the ICC, 
                                                                                                                                                               
to, the environment, and preliminary reflections on the situation in Cambodia, see L. Prosperi and 
J. Terrosi, ‘The Impact of Environmental Damage on the Selection and Prioritization of Cases 
before the International Criminal Court’, in this issue of the Journal. 
37  E.g. Weinstein, supra note 29; T. Smith, ‘Creating a Framework for the Prosecution of 
Environmental Crimes in International Criminal Law’, in W.A. Schabas, Y. McDermott, and N. 
Hayes (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical 
Perspectives (Routledge, 2013), at 46; M. Saif-Alden Wattad, ‘The Rome Statute and Captain 
Planet, What Lies Between Crimes against Humanity and the Natural Environment’, 19 Fordham 
Environmental Law Review (2009) 265; M. Orellana, ‘Criminal Punishment for Environmental 
Damage: Individual and State Responsibility at a Crossroad’, 17(4) GIELR (2005) 673. 
38 Freeland, supra note 19, at 202-204. 
39 In the Trial of German Major War Criminals, the International Military Tribunal found General 
Alfred Jodl guilty of war crimes associated with the scorched earth policy in Norway, Leningrad, 
and Moscow. Although this case may be seen as an early recognition of the criminal relevance of 
environmental damage caused by military tactics, the successful outcome was due to the fact that 
the Tribunal did not embrace the superior orders defence that Jodl claimed. See Judgment, The 
United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v. Hermann Wilhelm Göring et al., 
International Military Tribunal, 30 September 1946. A different result was achieved in a trial held 
by the Allied Forces in Nuremberg under Control Council Law No. 10. In the Hostages Trial, 
General Lothar Rendulic was prosecuted, inter alia, for unnecessary destruction of enemy 
property, having ordered scorched earth tactics in Norway. The Tribunal acquitted Rendulic on the 
basis of the argument that ‘he could honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the 
decision made’. Although there was no objective military necessity, the accused was found not 
guilty because ‘the doctrine of military necessity may be justified by one’s reasonable assessment 
of the situation’. In other words, Rendulic was objectively wrong in his assessment of the factual 
scenario, however the Tribunal maintained that the standards to evaluate military necessity are 
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no individual has been prosecuted or convicted for acts involving environmental 
harm. Whereas most scholarship points at the narrow provisions in the Rome 
Statute, and maintains that new norms are needed to enhance accountability, 
reasons beyond the limits of substantive rules should not be overlooked. These 
reasons relate both to the distinctive character of the phenomena under scrutiny 
and to some inherent features of the system of international criminal justice. This 
section argues that adjudicating environmental matters raises significant factual 
and evidentiary challenges, particularly in terms of causation and attribution. 
Hence, doubts arise as to whether the notion of individual criminal responsibility 
is adequate to confront phenomena that often have multi-factorial origins or are 
the result of collective actions (or of shared culpability). 
A first problem relates to establishing the facts, and collecting evidence of 
damage, because ‘the environment cannot speak for itself’. 40  Pollution, for 
instance, has to be measured through the collection of scientific samples that 
satisfy the standards of a criminal trial. These data can help to assess the degree of 
damage caused to the environment and whether it reached the threshold that 
makes it criminally relevant. It is evident that any delay or change in 
circumstances, e.g. rainfall, may affect the process of evidence gathering. As for 
environmental damage caused by warfare, evidence would likely be collected at 
the end of the hostilities, which might be years if not decades after the injury was 
inflicted, raising doubts on its reliability. The Report for the ICTY Prosecutor 
drafted by the Committee Established to Review the 1999 North-Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) Bombing Campaign in the former Yugoslavia drew 
attention to the issue of evidence gathering.41 The Committee noted that ‘[t]he 
OTP has been hampered in its assessment of the extent of environmental damage 
                                                                                                                                                               
subjective. See Judgment, United States v. Wilhelm List et al. (Case No. 7), Military Tribunal VII, 
19 February 1948.  
40 A. Fichtelberg, ‘Resource Wars, Environmental Crime, and the Laws of War: Updating War 
Crimes in a Resource Scarce World’, in Environmental Crimes and Social Conflict: Contemporary 
and Emerging Issues (Routledge, 2015), at 177.  
41 Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor, 13 June 2000, available online at 
http://www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-
campaign-against-federal (visited 25 May 2017) (‘ICTY Committee’). 
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in Kosovo by a lack of alternative and corroborated sources regarding the extent 
of environmental contamination caused by the NATO bombing campaign’.42 On 
that occasion, the only available evidence was a study by the UNEP.  
A second problem concerns causation, or the process of connecting a 
particular episode of environmental damage to the responsible subject. 
Environmental scholars have drawn attention to the complexity of establishing a 
causal relationship between a given act (or omission) and its environmentally 
harmful outcome, both in times of peace and war.43 Difficulties arise from the 
very nature of environmental harms and include the following factors: the 
geographical distance between the source of pollution and the damage to the 
environment; the time lapse between the conduct and the effects of the conduct on 
the environment; and, most importantly, the multi-factorial origin of 
environmental damage (i.e. the existence of several factors that could have caused 
the harmful outcome).44 This latter point is equally valid in attempting to establish 
the effects of certain environmental harms (e.g. the pollution of a river) on human 
health and other anthropocentric interests.  
Attribution of environmental destruction is even more difficult in situations 
of armed conflict where causation of a specific injury may be uncertain, or highly 
contested by the belligerent parties. On this point, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Committee maintained that ‘much of 
the environmental contamination which is discernible cannot unambiguously be 
attributed to the NATO bombing’.45 The UNEP study also found that ‘[p]art of the 
contamination identified at some sites clearly pre-dates the Kosovo conflict, and 
there is evidence of long-term deficiencies in the treatment and storage of 
hazardous waste’.46 As aptly observed by Mégret, environmental harms ‘often 
                                                          
42 Ibid., § 17. 
43 E.g. A. Kiss, ‘Present Limits to the Enforcement of State Responsibility for Environmental 
Damage’, in F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi (eds), International Responsibility for Environmental 
Harm (Graham and Trotman, 1991), at 5-6. 
44 Ibid. 
45 ICTY Committee, supra note 41, § 17 (emphasis added). 
46 Ibid., § 16 
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lack[s] the single-event character typical of ordinary localized crime, and 
consequently may be much more about process than one-time occurrence’.47 
Further, the nature of environmental harm poses challenges for the 
prosecution of business actors, who are often geographically and causally distant 
from the commission of the ‘environmental crime’. Legal tools to attribute 
criminal liability to corporate agents have been discussed by commentators.48 Yet 
the question is not just legal, but also factual. Indeed, the first step of the causal 
inquiry involves a factual question, described both in common and civil law 
systems as the ‘cause in fact’.49 As rightly noted by Gerry Simpson, ‘with … 
ecological crimes, the dispersion of culpability, the continuing legality of much 
structural behaviour, the sheer ubiquity of the offence, and the difficulties in 
teasing individual responsibility from collective action are likely to be particularly 
acute’.50  
It is acknowledged that all these problems may equally be faced by 
domestic courts, yet they may be more serious for international tribunals located 
far from the crime scene. They are also particularly acute in criminal trials, where 
the guilt of a particular individual must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 
Hence, the findings of the ICTY Committee serve as a reminder that criminal 
trials are technical enterprises, whose feasibility depends not just on the gravity of 
the alleged harmful conduct or the worthiness of the interest protected, but on the 
                                                          
47 Mégret, supra note 1, at 222. 
48 E.g. N. Farrell, ‘Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors Some Lessons from the 
International Tribunals’, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2010) 873, arguing 
that the doctrines of joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting, as developed by 
international criminal tribunals with regard to senior political and military leaders, could be 
employed to attribute responsibility to corporate executives located far from the crime scene. See 
also A. Batesmith, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility for War Crimes and Other Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law: the Impact of the Business and Human Rights Movement’, in C. 
Harvey, J. Summers and N. D. White (eds) Contemporary Challenges to the Law of War: Essays 
in Honour of Professor Peter Rowe (Cambridge University Press, 2014); K. Roberts, ‘Corporate 
Liability and Complicity in International Crimes’, in Jodoin and Cordonier Segger (eds), supra 
note 21, 190. 
49 In general, see M. Infantino, ‘Causation Theories and Causation Rules’, in M. Bussani and A.J. 
Sebok (eds), Comparative Tort Law: Global Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2015) 279. 




capacity of the Prosecutor to demonstrate the guilt of an individual for the charged 
conduct, as a matter of fact and law.  
  
D. The Difficult Task of Reconciling the Goals and Remedies of 
International Criminal Justice with those of Environmental Protection 
A further question raised by the 2016 Policy Paper is whether it is worth having a 
greener ICC, in light of its mandate and predominantly anthropocentric scope. 
While recognizing that there is some divergence between the goals of criminal 
justice and environmental protection, this section nonetheless contends that the 
reparative component of the ICC’s regime may be interpreted and developed with 
creativity, to address environmental matters in a meaningful way.  
Traditionally, three moral and rational justifications have been advanced for 
punishing criminal offenders: retributivism (just desert), utilitarianism (general 
and special prevention), and expressivism (social disapproval and reinforcement 
of norms).51 Whilst in international criminal law no theory has emerged as the 
preferred rationale for the imposition of individual criminal sanction,52 the ICTY 
in Erdemović held that international criminal responsibility combines elements of 
deterrence, reprobation, and retribution.53 The Preamble of the Rome Statute also 
specifically mentions retribution and general prevention. Deterrence is achieved 
through retribution, based on the assumption that ending impunity for the most 
heinous crimes will show potential future perpetrators that they too will face 
justice.54 More far-reachingly, however, it is also maintained that the goals of the 
international criminal justice system encompass the maintenance or promotion of 
                                                          
51 In general, see K. Ambos, ‘The Overall Function of International Criminal Law: Striking the 
Right Balance Between the Rechtsgut and the Harm Principles’, 9 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
(06/2015) 301. 
52 R. Provost, ‘International Criminal Environmental Law’, in G.S. Goodwin-Gill and S. Talmon 
(eds), The Reality of International Law (Oxford University Press, 1999), at 441. 
53 Judgment, Erdemović (IT-96-22-T), Trial Chamber, 29 November 1996, §§ 64-66. 
54  O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Observers' Notes, Article by Article (2nd edn.. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2008), at 10. 
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peace and security,55 establishment of a historical record of crimes,56 and ‘justice 
for victims’,57 including reparative justice.58 
At first, there seems to be some divergence between the goals of 
international criminal justice and those of environmental protection. 
Environmental harms are often irremediable, or at least long-lasting, thus in the 
words of the International Court of Justice, ‘vigilance and prevention’ ought to be 
the priority.59 The tension between the purposes, is reflected in the character of ex 
post facto remedies. When prevention fails, and damage occurs, environmental 
mitigation and restoration became necessary (e.g. clean-up measures, 
reintroduction of flora and fauna species in a particular ecosystem).  
As has been correctly observed, one of the biggest limitation of international 
criminal justice in the area of environmental protection concerns the inadequacy 
of remedies. 60  Article 77 of the ICC Statute lists imprisonment, fines and 
forfeiture of the proceeds of crime as the applicable penalties. Considering the 
historical focus of international criminal justice on anthropocentric values, 
unsurprisingly, environmental remediation is not envisaged as a possible criminal 
sanction. Conversely, the 1998 Convention for the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law of the Council of Europe explicitly establishes an 
obligation to restore the environment in case of conviction.61 
Further, until now, international criminal tribunals have been primarily 
concerned with the conduct of governments, or political or military organizations. 
                                                          
55 ICCSt., Preamble. 
56 Provost, supra note 52, at 441. 
57 L. Moffett, ‘Elaborating Justice for Victims at the International Criminal Court Beyond Rhetoric 
and The Hague’, 13 JICJ (2015) 1.  
58  C. Stahn, ‘Reparative Justice after the Lubanga Appeal Judgment: New Prospects for 
Expressivism and Participatory Justice or ‘Juridified Victimhood’ by Other Means?’ 13(4) JICJ 
(2015) 1. 
59 Case Concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), International Court of 
Justice, Judgment of 25 September 1997, § 141 (‘[t]he Court is mindful that, in the field of 
environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often 
irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very 
mechanism of reparation of this type of damage’). 
60 Drumbl, supra note 18, at 327. 
61 Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, 4 
November 1998, Art. 6. 
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Only occasionally and indirectly has international criminal justice addressed the 
behaviour of the private sector. Yet most environmental offences are indeed the 
result of private actions, often committed for self-interest or enrichment. As 
correctly observed, ‘war crimes and environmental crimes represent two 
completely different paradigms of criminality, standing on opposite ends of the 
public/private crime spectrum’. 62  Although the situation may be somewhat 
different after the outbreak of an armed conflict, where forms of collusion 
between private and public entities often take place, questions remain about the 
capacity of international criminal tribunals to fulfil their deterrent and remedial 
functions, at least with regard to environmental destruction, as long as the bulk of 
corporate activity appears out of reach.  
Of course, under the existing provisions of the Rome Statute, corporations 
themselves cannot be held criminally liable, but there is precedent for holding 
business representatives accountable in international criminal law. The post-
World War II trials against Nazi industrialists are the only relevant examples. 
Some commentators have noted the advantage of imposing criminal liability upon 
individuals for environmentally harmful conduct, as opposed to other forms of 
enforcement such as state responsibility, because non-state actors, and most 
notably corporate executives, can in principle be held accountable. 63  Yet, the 
impossibility of addressing corporate liability with adequate sanctions remains a 
strong limitation upon the international criminal law regime in preserving the 
environment and scarce natural resources. 
Whilst there are inherent limitations to what international criminal justice 
can achieve in the field of environmental protection and remediation, it is 
submitted that a more proactive role for the ICC in confronting environmental 
destruction can still be envisaged. Prosecuting core international crimes 
contributes to deterring conduct harmful to the environment by raising the costs of 
non-compliance (including the social and reputational costs associated with 
                                                          
62 Fichtelberg, supra note 40, at 182. 
63 Provost, supra note 52, at 446. 
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sentencing). Further, it has an impact on the public consciousness, reinforcing 
respect for the rule of law and the fundamental interests it protects. Mark Drumbl 
correctly recognizes that expressivism may be the strongest reason for prosecuting 
‘environmental crimes’ before international fora.64  
One might point out that these are largely symbolic functions, and indeed 
they are. Hence, they should be complemented by a second, more practical 
contribution. In terms of remedies, pursuant to Article 75 of the ICC Statute, 
reparations can be ordered by the Court as a result of a conviction. It is the 
combination of punitive and reparative justice that distinguishes the ICC from 
other international criminal tribunals and that, if developed, may help to address 
environmental matters in a more meaningful way.  
In accordance with the 2016 Policy Paper, a distinction should be made 
between two scenarios. First, if the defendant is found guilty of a crime ‘that 
result(s) in the destruction of the environment’, most notably Article 8(2)(b)(iv). 
In such a situation, it will be difficult to argue that the environment qualifies as 
the ‘victim’ of the crime and thus the beneficiary of any reparation order, 
especially considering the wording of Rule 85 which limits such eligible victims 
to ‘natural persons’. Second, if the defendant is found guilty of a crime that is 
committed ‘by means of … the destruction of the environment’, for instance a 
crime against humanity. In this case, individual and collective reparations can be 
awarded to the (human) victims who suffered any loss or injury (including 
impaired health or disease) as a result of the commission of the underlying 
environmental wrongs.  
In the second scenario, a possible way to move towards more 
environmentally focused reparations (beyond conventional compensation for 
medical expenses or loss of property) may be through the appointment of experts. 
At the request of victims or their legal representatives, or the convicted person, or 
on its own motion, the ICC may appoint experts to assist in evaluating the harm to 
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victims. The experts may also ‘suggest various options concerning the appropriate 
types and modalities of reparations’.65 Hence, the appointment of experts may be 
a useful tool to secure that, for instance, collective reparations address also 
environmental concerns related to the commission of the anthropocentric offences 
(e.g. the costs incurred to clean-up a river or to restore damaged natural resources).  
In sum, there is some tension between the goals and remedies of 
international criminal justice and those of environmental preservation that, 
coupled with factual and evidentiary obstacles, may in part explain the limited 
engagement (until now) of international criminal tribunals with environmental 
wrongs. It is submitted, however, the adoption of creative approaches to 
reparations in the ICC’s future practice may be a sound way to move forward. By 
doing so, the ICC would complement its predominant retributive paradigm, which 
remains limited in addressing environmental matters, and contribute in practical 
ways to accountability.  
 
3. Conclusions  
The protection of the environment (and thereby of humanity) from particularly 
harmful conduct is not completely alien to the ICC’s purview, although it has 
been neglected until now. As observed by the late Judge Christopher 
Weeramantry, who often took a progressive view on environmental protection, 
international obligations with respect of the environment ‘may range from 
obligations erga omnes, through obligations which are in the nature of jus cogens, 
all the way up to the level of international crimes’.66  
This article argued that, in addition to the limitations of the substantive law, 
the significance of the 2016 Policy Paper ought to be assessed against factual and 
structural concerns. The essay sought to maintain a balance between optimistic 
and pessimistic views of some of the realities which may inform the practical 
                                                          
65 Rule 97(2) ICC RPE,  
66 C. Weeramantry, Universalizing International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), at 451. 
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implementation of the Prosecutor’s case selection strategy. The challenges 
identified in the paper are real, but so are the opportunities associated with the 
OTP’s ‘green shift’. Beyond the symbolic and expressivist value of adjudicating 
environmental matters before the ICC, there are real possibilities for interpreting 
existing provisions in a greener fashion, developing principles on causation and 
broadening the reparative arsenal of the Court to encompass environmentally 
meaningful measures. Ultimately, in what might be seen as difficult times, the 
‘rebranding’ of the OTP’s priorities, from solely prosecuting government officials 
and leaders of armed groups for war crimes or political repression to more diffuse 
harms caused by mid-level agents and, hopefully, corporate actors, may give new 
moral strength to the institution.  
At the same time, it is crystal clear that the ICC will never be able to do 
justice to all forms of environmental destruction, as it is evident that criminal 
accountability is just one dimension of ‘environmental justice’, which embraces 
elements of retributive, corrective and distributive justice.67 The ICC can only 
address the symptoms of the world’s inequalities, and not the structural and root 
causes in the economic, social and ecological fields that gave rise to such 
symptoms. The system of international criminal law has its limits in producing the 
transformations necessary to achieve ‘environmental justice’ in full. Yet, in the 
battle between the international criminal law believers and sceptics, for the time 
being, it is perhaps a wise move to take a moderate stand. 
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